The Two Natures of the Incarnate Christ and the Bearer Question by Guta, Mihretu P.
2019 TheoLogica   
An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 
S. I. THE SON OF GOD 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v2i3.17663  
113 
 
The Two Natures of the Incarnate Christ and 
the Bearer Question 
 
MIHRETU P. GUTA  
Biola University & Azusa Pacific University 
mihretu.p.guta@biola.edu  
 
Abstract: The Chalcedonian Definition states that the incarnate Christ is 
both fully human and fully divine. But spelling out what the 
Chalcedonian Definition entails continues to be a subject of intense 
controversy among philosophers and theologians alike. One of these 
controversies concerns what I call the problem of the bearer question. At the 
heart of this question lies whether or not the two natures of Christ 
require two distinct bearers. In section I, I will explain the problem of the 
bearer question and how it arises directly due to the Chalcedonian 
Definition. In section II, I will propose a solution to the problem of the 
bearer question within the framework of what I call, a ‘Multi–Track 
Disposition Model of the Incarnation’. At the heart of this model lies the 
notion that the manifestation of properties is multi–directional in the 
sense that there is a reciprocal partnership among property 
manifestations. In section III, I will contrast the solution proposed to the 
bearer question by the Multi–Track Model to that of a ‘Kenotic Model of 
the Incarnation’. I will argue that the Multi–Track Model provides us 
with better conceptual resources to make sense of the bearer question. 
Finally, in section IV, I will briefly point out why ultimately a conclusive 
answer to the bearer question may still prove to be elusive because the 
bearer question gives rise to a host of other unresolved questions.  
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Introduction  
 
At the heart of the Chalcedonian Definition (for brevity CD) lies the claim that 
the incarnate Christ is both fully human and fully divine.1 Spelling out what CD 
entails, however, continues to be a subject of controversy among philosophers 
and theologians. Whether or not there is a promising prospect to fully work 
through theological as well as philosophical complexities that arise in dealing 
                                                 
1 For a fuller description of the Chalcedonian Definition (AD 451) see Noll (2000, 76) and 
Sanders (2007). 
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with CD, a pro–Chalcedonian theorist cannot afford to compromise four non–
negotiable claims that are ontological kernels of CD:2  
 
(1) Identity Thesis: The incarnate Logos is numerically one person.  
(2) Nature(s) Thesis: The incarnate Logos is fully human and fully divine.  
(3) Distinction Thesis: The incarnate Logos’s human and divine natures 
are distinct.  
(4) Unity Thesis: The incarnate Logos is a unifier of the human and the 
divine natures.  
 
Individually taken, these theses enjoy some level of conceptual autonomy from 
each other in that the concepts are not univocal. At the most basic level, 
however, the four theses are interdependent and interrelated. In fact, an 
adequate grasp of (1) will be hard to come by without taking into account (2)–
(4). Similarly, making progress on (2) is contingent on whether or not we take 
into account (1), (3) and (4). Again dealing with (3) necessitates bringing to the 
table (1), (2) and (4). Last, but not the least, making progress on (4) requires 
direct engagement with (1) – (3). Taken together, as I shall argue, (1)–(4) can be 
shown to make a coherent whole as well as collectively underlie what I shall 
call the problem of the bearer question. At the heart of the problem of the bearer 
question lies figuring out whether or not the two natures of Christ require more 
than one bearer.  
We can investigate this problem in at least three ways. The first way concerns 
the two bearers view. On this theory, the two natures of Christ can be said to 
have two distinct bearers. That is, one bearer for the human nature and another 
bearer for the divine nature. The second way concerns the one bearer view. On 
this theory, the two natures of Christ can be said to have a single bearer. The 
third way concerns the hybrid of the two bearers and the one bearer views. On 
the hybrid theory, there is a sense in which the two natures of Christ can be said 
to require two bearers and there is also another sense in which the two natures 
of Christ can be said to require one bearer. But the hybrid view does not make 
headlines in the literature. In this case, the one bearer view takes the driver’s 
seat in dominating discussions besetting CD. Also as we shall see, the two 
bearer–view is unacceptable because it’s unorthodox by virtue of Nestorian 
heresy. However, in this essay, I will attempt to show why the hybrid view 
should be taken seriously, since it does more comprehensive justice to the 
central claims of CD as indicated in (1)–(4). For reasons that will be explained 
                                                 
2 In characterizing CD in this way, I am rejecting linguistic as well as metaphorical readings 
of CD. In the case of the former, CD is said to be ‘‘linguistically regulatory’’ with no further 
ontological intent whereas in the case of the latter, the language of CD is said to be metaphorical 
in nature. For details on these and other readings of CD, see Coakley (2002). 
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throughout this essay, I associate the two bearers view with the easy problem of 
the bearer question; the one bearer view with the hard problem of the bearer question 
and the hybrid view with the hardest problem of the bearer question, respectively.3 
My primary focus in this essay will be on the hardest problem of the bearer 
question.  
Of the four central claims that underlie the bearer question, as I will argue in 
this essay, (1) takes up the driver’s seat in its metaphysical centrality. Not only 
does (1) set the tone for the problem of the bearer question as a whole, but it 
also imposes constraints on the sort of answers a proponent of CD proposes to 
(2)–(4). So in spelling out the ontology of the personhood of the incarnate 
Christ, our primary starting point must be (1). More importantly, a close 
examination of (1) sheds important theological as well as philosophical insights 
on the question of what actually can be said to have happened to the Logos, the 
second person of Trinity, at the incarnation. At the heart of the doctrine of the 
incarnation lies, “the belief that at a particular point in human history, a 
member of the Trinitarian God became, or took on, flesh and a genuine human 
existence in Jesus of Nazareth” (Holland 2012, 59; cf. Crisp 2016 and Webster 
2004). The problem of the bearer question primarily consists in discerning the 
manner in which God assumed humanity.  
The solution to the problem of the bearer question will finally emerge from 
what I call: a Multi–Track Disposition Model of the Incarnation. This is the 
model that attempts to spell out the incarnate Christ’s divine and human 
natures within the framework of the contemporary metaphysics of dispositions 
or what is also known as a ‘‘powers ontology’’ (Heil 2012 and 2005, 343). A 
disposition is said to be a “capacity”, “power”, “potentiality”, or “property” an 
object or substance possesses.4 Dispositions are said to manifest themselves in 
certain ways under different circumstances. For example, salt manifests 
solubility (i.e. a disposition) by dissolving if it is put in water. To avoid 
confusion, unless otherwise stated, in this article, I take the term ‘disposition’ to 
mean property.5 I use the phrase ‘dispositional properties’ when I talk about 
properties associated with the incarnate Christ. I will argue that for compelling 
philosophical as well as theological reasons, adopting a Multi–Track 
Disposition Model of the Incarnation proves to be much preferable to solving 
the problem of the bearer question to that of a Kenotic Model of the Incarnation. 
                                                 
3 The phrases ‘easy problem’ and ‘hard problem’ are taken from David Chalmers’s famous 
theory of the problem of consciousness, see Chalmers (1996) and (2010). 
4 Some philosophers distinguish between the notion of “disposition” and the notion of 
“power”, see Bird (2013). But following Heil, I use these notions interchangeably, see Heil 
(2005). 
5 Taking dispositions as properties could be disputed but there are excellent reasons for 
taking them as such, see Vetter (2015) and Mumford (1998).  
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Unlike a Kenotic Model of the Incarnation, a Multi–Track Disposition Model of 
the Incarnation has better conceptual resources to satisfy the metaphysical 
questions we confront regarding the personhood of the incarnate Christ. I 
conclude this article by claiming that, ultimately a conclusive answer to the 
problem of the bearer question may still prove to be elusive because the bearer 
question gives rise to a host of other unresolved questions.  
 
1. The Problem  
 
Above I classified the theories we use to investigate the problem of the bearer 
question into three domains, namely: the easy, the hard and the hardest. Yet 
these domains are not entirely independent of each other. In fact, the easy 
problem of the bearer question is said to be easy only relative to the hard 
problem of the bearer question and similarly, the hard problem of the bearer 
question is said to be hard relative to the easy problem of the bearer question. 
Again, the hardest problem of the bearer question is said to be hardest relative 
to both the hard and the easy problems of the bearer questions. Taken this way, 
these three categories of the problem of the bearer question can be said to be 
quasi–interdefinable. Each domain poses different levels of difficulties to a pro–
Chalcedonian theorist. 
 
1.2. The Easy Problem  
 
Central to the easy problem of the bearer question is figuring out whether or 
not the incarnate Christ’s human and divine natures each independently 
necessitate two distinct bearers. That is, a human bearer for the human nature 
and a divine bearer for the divine nature. More precisely, the easy problem of 
the bearer question asks whether Jesus of Nazareth is the bearer of the human 
nature whereas the Logos is the bearer of the divine nature. Put this way, the 
easy problem of the bearer question is comprised of two propositions:  
 
P1: Jesus of Nazareth is the bearer of the human nature.  
 
P2: The Logos is the bearer of the divine nature.  
 
It could be said that, individually considered, there is nothing wrong with P1 
and P2. For example, as they stand, P1 and P2 do not give rise to a notoriously 
difficult predicate attribution problem, which as we shall see, is the case in 
relation to the one bearer theory. The main issue that should concern a defender 
of P1 and P2 would be spelling out the nature of unity that can be said to exist 
between Jesus of Nazareth and the Logos. But the devil is in the details. 
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Whether individually or collectively taken, P1 and P2 raise a biblical/theological 
red flag for a pro–Chalcedonian theorist. The biblical/theological red flag I have 
in mind can be summed up as follows. That is, individually considered, P1 and 
P2 can go their own separate ways. In this case, for example, the predicate of 
P1, ‘‘…the bearer of the human nature’’ is not predicated of the subject of P2 
and similarly, the predicate of P2, ‘‘…the bearer of the divine nature’’ is not 
predicated of the subject of P1. But understood this way, P1 and P2 turn out to 
be in serious conflict with (1) thereby violating CD. Recall that (1) is the identity 
thesis according to which the incarnate Logos is numerically one person. 
Against (1), collectively considered, that is, the conjunction of P1 and P2, 
multiplies entities beyond necessity. That is, P1 and P2 refer to two distinct 
bearers. We can put this point as follows:  
 
P3: Jesus of Nazareth is the bearer of the human nature and the Logos is 
the bearer of the divine nature.  
 
But in light of (1), which is one of the central claims of CD, P3 would not be 
acceptable. This is precisely because P3 implies Nestorianism, the view that 
assumes two persons in the incarnate Christ, namely human and divine. If 
Nestorianism is true, then it follows that there are two independent souls, wills 
and centers of consciousness in the incarnate Logos. But Chalcedon 
unequivocally rules out such an ontology of the personhood of Christ. So for a 
pro–Chalcedonian theorist P3 does not seem to pose a serious theological threat 
and thus, it can be considered to be an easy problem to deal with. This is 
because the case against one of the early Christological heresies, Nestorianism 
(which P3 entails) is now a settled matter. But settled on what grounds? Here 
following James Arcadi, we can say that the grounds involve scripture, creeds 
and the teachings of the church. As Arcadi remarks:  
 
When thinkers past and present reflect on the data provided in these starting 
points [i.e., scripture, creeds or other authoritative teachings of the Christian 
Church], by and large they have come to the conclusion that Christianity teaches 
that Jesus Christ is both God and a human being. Those following the creedal 
material of the Nicene Creed and “Definition” of Chalcedon take it that Jesus 
Christ is one person—the second person of the Trinity—with two natures, the 
divine nature and an instance of human nature (Arcadi 2018, 1).  
 
1.2. The Hard Problem  
 
Given that P3 is rejected, for some of the reasons given above, the bearer 
question should be modified. In its modified version, the problem of the bearer 
question boils down to making sense of (2) the nature thesis in relation to (1) the 
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identity thesis. Recall that (2) states that the incarnate Logos is fully human and 
fully man. (1) States that the incarnate Logos is numerically one person, i.e. the 
God–man. To see where the hard problem of the bearer question lies in (1) and 
(2), they have to be merged together, in which case P3 should be modified as 
P3*:  
 
P3*: The incarnate Logos/Jesus Christ is the bearer of both the human 
nature and the divine nature.  
 
Compared to P1, P2 and P3, the advantage of P3* consists in avoiding the 
separation problem of P1 and P2 on the one hand and the 
duplication/multiplying problem of P3 on the other hand. The sense in which 
P3* avoids both of these problems is by merging the subject of P1, that is, Jesus 
Christ with the subject of P2, that is, the Divine Logos. In doing so, P3* also 
unifies the predicates of both P1 and P2 under one umbrella or subject (Jesus 
Christ/Divine Logos). In this case, P3* satisfies (4) the unity thesis according to 
which the incarnate Logos is a unifier of the human and the divine natures. The 
sense in which P3* satisfies (4) consists in an ontologically rooted co–existence 
of the two natures of Christ in a single bearer. Moreover, P3* satisfies (3) the 
distinction thesis which states that the incarnate Logos’s human and divine 
natures are distinct. The sense in which P3* satisfies (3) consists in an 
ontologically rooted real as opposed to mere conceptual distinction that holds 
between the two natures of Christ exemplified by a single bearer.  
What emerges from P3* is the notion that makes the heart of CD. That is, a 
single person, Jesus Christ is both a human being and a divine being. In his 
essay entitled, “Recent Developments in Analytic Christology” (also quoted 
earlier), Arcadi points out that over the past four decades, the notion that a 
single person, Jesus Christ has both divine and human natures produced an 
immense amount of discussion (2018). One of the major concerns in these 
discussions has to do with the coherence of attributing divine and human 
attributes to a single person as indicated by P3*. Timothy Pawl claims that the 
incoherence associated with P3*, which he describes as a “fundamental 
problem”, arises due to incompatible predications taken to be true of a single 
person, the God–man Jesus Christ. Some of the incompatible predicates Pawl 
discusses include, “passible” and “impassible”. Attributing these sorts of 
incompatible predicates to a single person, Jesus Christ is said to result in 
contradiction (Pawl 2015, 86–88). Pawl responds to this charge within the 
framework of what he calls Conciliar Christology. At the heart of Conciliar 
Christology is the claim that the incarnate Christ is divine and human. Pawl’s 
main goal in developing his Conciliar Christology is to look for a solution to the 
‘incompatible predicates’ charge raised against the person of Christ. After 
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discussing various proposed solutions, Pawl draws his own conclusion by 
arguing why the alleged incompatible predicates are not incompatible when 
said of the same thing. But here I cannot get into the details of Pawl’s extensive 
discussions (Pawl 2015, 102–103; see also Pawl 2014 and 2016).  
Unlike Pawl’s approach which seems to be primarily linguistic in its 
orientation, Thomas Senor characterises the objection levelled against 
propositions like P3* as being metaphysical in nature. As Senor puts it:  
 
To be fully divine is to meet all of those conditions necessary for divinity. Such 
a person will then be omnipotent and omniscient. To be fully human, on the 
other hand, requires a person to be limited in power and knowledge. So a 
person who is fully divine and fully human will be an omnipotent, omniscient 
being who is limited in power and knowledge. But that is a logically 
inconsistent description. Therefore, the doctrine of the incarnation is not even 
possibly true: it represents a metaphysical impossibility (2007, 558).  
 
Although this objection is being framed from a metaphysical standpoint, 
Senor’s subsequent analysis of it is more drawn towards making sense of 
whether or not the logical inconsistency objection holds up. Senor formulates 
the objection in six steps and describes it as the “inconsistent argument” (Ibid. 
558). At the heart of the inconsistent argument is the assertion that Jesus Christ 
is fully divine and fully human. It is also said that Christ is an omnipotent and 
omniscient being. Yet, the same person, Christ is also said to be limited in 
power and knowledge. But how can this be? Senor discusses well–known 
responses proposed by kenotic theorists, Morris’s ‘two minds’ theory and the 
compositional model theorists to the inconsistence argument. He takes the 
responses to be inconclusive. Pawl’s and Senor’s focus on the logical 
consistency aspect of P3* can be better understood as being attempts at 
resolving the hard problem of the bearer question. This must be the case 
because as we shall see, there is the hardest problem of the bearer question. If I 
am right about this, then in solving or at least in trying to solve the logical 
consistency problem, we can only say that we are focusing on one of the 
difficulties we face in dealing with P3*.  
 
1.3. The Hardest Problem  
 
P3* is susceptible to blurring the ontological distinction between Jesus Christ 
and the Logos. In doing so, P3* also blurs the sense in which the predicates of 
P1 and P2 are united under one subject (Jesus Christ/Divine Logos). Such a 
blurring problem could get even worse if P3* is taken to imply a metaphysical 
identity in the sense that Jesus of Nazareth being strictly (i.e., numerically) 
identical with the Logos. To see this, we need to understand that, in his pre–
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incarnate state, the second person of the Trinity, the Logos, had no contact with 
physical matter. That is, until the time of the incarnation, the Logos did not 
experience embodiment. In this case, the greatest mystery of the incarnation lies 
in how it was possible for the Logos to become an embodied being.  
While we may never know the details involving the Logos’ becoming an 
embodied being, we can still raise questions as to what happened at the 
incarnation. These questions underlie what I earlier called a hybrid view. At the 
heart of the hybrid view lies the claim that there is a sense in which the two 
natures of Christ can be said to require two bearers and there is also another 
sense in which the two natures of Christ can be said to be true of one bearer. In 
this case, the essentials of the hybrid view emerge from the analysis of the 
interrelation that exists between the following three questions: (A) is the 
incarnate Logos a physical being?; (B) is the incarnate Logos a purely 
immaterial being?; and (C) how does the incarnate Logos relate to the body of 
Jesus? If the incarnate Logos is a physical being, then He can be said to be a 
bearer of all physical properties that are necessary and sufficient for physicality. 
If the incarnate Logos is a purely immaterial being, then He can be said to be a 
bearer of all non–physical properties that are necessary and sufficient for 
immateriality. Here what we want to know is if there can be a sense in which 
two distinct bearers, in this case, a bearer of physical properties on the one hand 
and a bearer of non–physical properties can make up a single person. If this is 
possible, then a good case can be made to show that numerically distinct 
properties do not necessitate numerically distinct bearers thereby insulating the 
hybrid view potentially from being associated with Nestorianism.  
Although by no means perfect, an analogy can be drawn from human 
ontology to flesh out the concept of a “single bearer–two bearers” hybrid view. 
Suppose that a human being is a purely material being. In that case, some non–
reductive physicalist theories claim that despite being a purely physical being, a 
human person is a bearer of two distinct properties, namely: physical properties 
such as the firing of neurons in the brain and mental properties such as desire, 
beliefs and intentions (see Murphy and Brown 2007, 1–3 and 7–9). Here one of 
the significant problems defenders of this view face, inter alia, is showing how a 
physical system such as the brain can be said to be a bearer of non–physical 
properties. No conclusive philosophical or scientific solution is in sight in 
resolving this issue yet (see Kim 2006, 290–305; Chalmers 1996 and 2010). 
But at the least, defenders of this view do not see a problem with a notion of 
“one bearer–two distinct properties”. By contrast, suppose that a human person 
is a material–immaterial complex. In this case, some non–Cartesian substance 
dualists like E. J. Lowe argue that a human person does not appear to be 
identifiable with his or her organic body nor with any part of it, such as the 
brain. Lowe argues that a human person is physically embodied and even can 
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be a “physical thing” in the sense of possessing physical characteristics. But 
Lowe argues that since different identity conditions apply to a human person 
and an organic body which embodies it, they are ontologically distinct. On 
Lowe’s version of substance dualism, there are two distinct bearers of two 
distinct properties in a single embodied human being (see Lowe 2008, chaps. 1 
and 5; cf. Guta 2011, 35–58). On Lowe’s human ontology, there is a sense in 
which we can think of two distinct bearers of two distinct properties, namely a 
material body or part of it such as the brain on the one hand and a non–physical 
human person on the other hand. But here we do not want to say that every 
time we see a particular human person, say Mihretu, we are seeing more than 
one person. That would be highly counterintuitive. A common–sense 
conception of ourselves is that we are unified human persons. So there is a 
sense in which it can be said that there is one unified, embodied human 
person—a bearer of mental and physical properties. But within such unity it is 
also the case that there are two distinct bearers for mental and physical 
properties respectively.  
Unlike the non–reductive physicalist theories, Lowe’s dualist view nicely 
illustrates and captures the spirit of the hybrid view, i.e., the notion of “a single 
bearer–two bearers”. But how does the hybrid view apply to the ontology of the 
personhood of Christ? To answer this question, first we need to establish some 
facts regarding the incarnate Logos’s relation to the body of Jesus of Nazareth. 
In this case, the hardest problem of the bearer question single handedly consists 
in figuring out the nature of the relationship between Jesus and the Logos. But 
here we should guard against making two interrelated mistakes. These are: 
over–emphasizing the divinity of Christ over His humanity on the one hand 
and over–emphasizing the humanity of Christ over His divinity on the other 
hand. The former gives rise to what I call the divinity favoring problem whereas 
the latter gives rise to the humanity favoring problem. Yet, not every pro–
Chalcedonian theorists see this issue in the way it is being suggested here. As 
we shall see in section III, some pro–Chalcedonian theorists seem to worry a lot 
about preserving the humanity of Christ. This sort of problem is related to the 
sort of worries considered in our examination of P3*. To see this again, we need 
to modify P3* as P3**.  
 
P3**: The Logos is Jesus Christ.  
 
We must begin our examination of P3** by disambiguating the sense of the 
auxiliary verb ‘is’. Since the time of Aristotle, analytic philosophers distinguish 
between, at least, four distinct senses of ‘is’. First, the ‘is’ of attribution, as in 
‘Plato is wise’. Second, the ‘is’ of identity, as in ‘Water is H2O’. Third, the ‘is’ of 
instantiation, as in ‘A human being is a mammal’. Fourth, the ‘is’ of 
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constitution, as in ‘A human brain is a collection of nerve cells’ (see Lowe 2009, 
3–4). Of these four senses of ‘is’, what is implicated in P3** is, the ‘is’ of identity. 
Depending on the sort of conclusion one infers based on the ‘is’ of identity in 
P3**, important theological as well as metaphysical questions could emerge. For 
example, given P3**, does strict (i.e., numerical) identity hold between the 
Logos and Jesus Christ? If so, as Arcadi points out, for some defenders of 
“transformationalist model of the incarnation”, such a strict identity relation 
between the Logos and Jesus means that at the incarnation, the Logos 
transformed into a human (Arcadi 2018, 4–5). For example, within the 
framework of his physicalist ontology, Trenton Merricks claims, “God the Son 
in the incarnation is identical with the body of Jesus. That is, in becoming 
human, he became a body” (2007, 294).  
But in light of the hybrid view defended in this essay, any attempt that tends 
to favour divinity over humanity or vice versa in the person of Christ turns out 
to be unacceptable. In this case, we will have to reconceive the bearer question 
and if we do so, then the incarnate Logos can be said to be the single bearer of 
the two distinct natures, human and divine. But the bearer question as 
reconceived here needs more unpacking. In this case, our focus should be on 
spelling out the sort of unity that exists between the Logos and Jesus of 
Nazareth. We also need to show in what sense the Logos can be said to be 
genuinely human without thereby forfeiting any of His pre–incarnate 
ontological nature and identity. In this case, we can modify P3** as P3***:  
 
  P3***: The Logos is an embodied being.  
 
Unlike the other formulations examined so far, P3*** avoids both the divine 
favoring and the human favoring problems. We can also see that given P3***, it is 
the human Jesus Christ’s body that the Logos assumed in becoming incarnate. 
Sometimes it is said that the incarnate Logos cannot experience human 
limitations and also maintain at the same time all of His divine attributes for 
that would lead to logical incoherence. But the incoherence charge is misplaced 
(see Morris 1986, 9–24). Kenosis theorists also claim that certain divine 
properties must be rendered temporarily inoperative to make room for the 
human nature. For reasons we shall see, I find such arguments to be highly 
unpersuasive. For now, I suggest two ways to make sense of the hardest problem 
of the bearer question in light of P3***. Both of these ways attempt to shed some 
light on the nature of the ontological unity between the Logos and Jesus.  
First, following John Webster, I too think that adopting the language of 
anhypostasis and enhypostasis, gives us an excellent conceptual framework to 
make sense of the Logos’s becoming flesh. These concepts, as Webster points 
out, show two things. First, the man Jesus has no personal center of subsistence, 
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i.e., hypostasis in and of himself. Hence, the man Jesus is said to be 
“anhypostatic”. Secondly, the man Jesus’s hypostasis is “in” the Logos which 
assumes flesh. That means that the human nature of the man Jesus is said to be 
“enhypostatic” or dependent on the Logos (Webster 2004, 218; cf. Crisp 2007, 
Chap. 3). Second, along similar lines, Anna Marmodoro and Jonathan Hill 
defend the model of incarnation that allows for an existential dependence 
between the Logos and Jesus. As Marmodoro and Hill remark: 
 
Existential dependence allows one to distinguish the two property bearers in 
Christ…But at the same time it gives a relation between these two bearers 
which is strong enough to account for a genuine unity between 
them….Existential dependence—embedded in a model in which Jesus comes 
into being only at the moment of union—appears to deliver the most promising 
metaphysics of the incarnation… (Marmodoro and Hill 2008, 124). 
 
Marmodoro and Hill’s, as well as Webster’s remarks as briefly stated above 
might open a door for an objection. For example, it could be said that given that 
the human Jesus Christ is ontologically dependent on the Logos as discussed 
above, it would follow that such Christology suffers from divinity favoring 
problem and humanity understating problem. If this objection has merit, then it 
should be of a serious concern for a pro–Chalcedonian theorist. This is because 
favouring divinity over humanity or vice versa in the person of Christ would be 
incompatible as Marmodoro and Hill correctly observed with “the 
soteriological principle that, for salvation to happen, humanity and divinity 
must have met in a genuine unity” (2008, 99).  
However, I do not think that the objection considered here succeeds. For one 
thing, the objection in this case reverses the order of what is being stated in 
P3***. The primary issue in P3*** is to figure out how divinity united with 
humanity as opposed to the other way around. If so, what P3*** requires from 
us is to provide a framework within which we can make sense of the coequal 
existence of the divine and human natures in a single embodied bearer. It seems 
then perfectly plausible to say that Jesus of Nazareth is the bearer of the human 
nature and the Logos is the bearer of the divine nature yet the deep intrinsic 
unity that obtains between Jesus and the Logos make up a single unified 
person. So there is a sense in which there are two bearers of distinct properties 
in the incarnate Christ and yet there is another sense in which it can also be said 
that there is one bearer of divine and human natures, that is, the one God–man. 
Such analysis is what the hybrid view attempts to capture.  
Given that P3*** presents the Logos as an embodied being, it nicely captures 
the spirit of (1) that is, the identity thesis in the sense of bringing humanity and 
divinity to converge on a single bearer. But how do the central claims of the 
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hybrid view apply in the case of the incarnate Logos? How would the 
manifestations of the divine and the human natures of the incarnate Logos play 
out in a single bearer? These are extremely important questions that need to be 
properly addressed if we are to have any meaningful progress in our handling 
of the hardest problem of the bearer question. In the next section I take up that 
discussion within the framework of the “Multi–Track Disposition Model of 
Incarnation”.6 
 
2. Multi–Track Disposition Model of the Incarnation 
 
In the first part of this section, I will briefly explain what the notion of a multi–
track disposition is. In the second part, I will use the metaphysics of 
dispositions discussed in the first section to develop the multi–track disposition 
model of the incarnation and show how the model sheds some light on the 
hardest problem of the bearer question which this essay focuses on.  
 
2.1. Dispositions 
 
What are dispositions? Commonly understood, dispositions are taken to be 
properties that can be ascribed to things. Stephen Mumford distinguishes three 
classes of such things, namely objects, substances and persons (Mumford 1998, 
3; cf. Guta 2016, 4–11). We say that a glass is fragile or a person is irascible or 
sugar is soluble. Unlike categorical properties,7 dispositional properties are said 
to be distinguished by their manifestations. But the manifestation of 
dispositional properties are contingent on the presence of the relevant 
circumstances that give rise to them. For example, a fragile glass may not break, 
say if it is not dropped on the floor. Yet ‘fragility’ is said to be present in the 
glass. Again an irascible person may not express anger, say if he or she is not 
provoked yet still has irascibility. As Barbara Vetter points out, in making such 
dispositional claims, we are not primarily saying something about what fragile 
things such as the glass, or irascible person or soluble sugar is actually doing. 
Rather we are implying what such things would or could do. Understood this 
way, dispositions are said to be modal properties, linking them to possibility 
(Vetter 2015, 33ff). In light of such observations, a preliminary characterization 
                                                 
6 For contemporary discussions on the metaphysics of disposition, see Vetter (2015), 
Mumford (1998) and Heil (2012). Here I also draw upon my ‘multi-track dispositions’ view as it 
relates to human ontology, see Guta (2016).  
7 Philosophers disagree over what categorical properties are and whether or not they even 
exist. Mumford uses “a crystalline structure of the glass or pottery” as example to illustrate 
categorical property, Mumford (2013). But nothing I have to say here hinges on these 
controversies. 
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of the concept of dispositions takes the following form: “A disposition is 
individuated by the pair of its stimulus condition and its manifestation…: it is a 
disposition to M when S” (Vetter 2015, 34). The details in spelling out this sort 
of characterization of dispositions are often marked by complicated analyses 
involving conditionals. For example, Vetter expresses the simple conditional 
analysis of fragility as follows (Vetter 2013, 330):  
 
(SCA) X is fragile iff, if X were struck, X would break. 
 
 Here ‘X’ stands for a certain object, say a glass. The term ‘struck’ refers to the 
stimulus condition and the term ‘break’ stands for the manifestation. If, in this 
case, the stimulus condition is satisfied, that is, something strikes a glass then 
the breaking of a glass (i.e. its manifestation) follows. So, as it stands, SCA can 
be said to be true of our experiences of fragile things. We readily believe and in 
fact, take it for granted that, if we strike or drop fragile things, then we expect 
them to shatter or break. Although this is generally true, as we shall see, there 
are cases where even when the stimulus condition is satisfied, the relevant 
manifestation may not ensue. So there are counterexamples against SCA. 
 
2.2. What Are Multi–Track Dispositions? 
 
Now that we have some grasp of what the notion of a disposition amounts to, it 
is time to talk about multi–track dispositions. Originally, the term ‘multi–track’ 
was coined by Gilbert Ryle (1963, 114). The adjective ‘multi–track’ refers to the 
many ways by which the manifestation of dispositions takes place. In this case, 
multi–track dispositions are said to be individuated by several pairs of their 
stimulus conditions and their manifestations (Vetter 2015, 34). That is to say 
that multi–track dispositions have more than one kind of stimulus condition or 
manifestation, or both (Bird 2007, 21). Understood this way, multi–track 
dispositions are contrasted with single–track dispositions. In this case, Vetter 
characterizes a single–track disposition as follows: 
 
(ST) Where D is a disposition and C a conditional of the form: if x were S, then x 
would be M, D is adequately characterized by C (and C alone) only if: 
(a) For all objects x that have D, if x were S, then ceteris paribus x would be M. 
(b) For all objects x that have D, if x manifests D at t, then x is M at t and x is S at 
or before t. (Vetter 2013, 334) 
 
Vetter’s point is that to establish a single–track disposition, say a particular 
fragility of a glass with its corresponding particular manifestation (shattering), 
we need to show that (a) and (b) are satisfied. As they stand, (a) and (b) are not 
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controversial. Given (a), if a certain object with certain disposition is stimulated, 
provided that something does not stand in its way that blocks its manifestation, 
then the relevant disposition will be manifested. Also as Vetter points out, 
given (b), if a disposition is characterized by a single conditional, we should 
expect to see it being characterized by a single pair of stimulus condition and 
manifestation. Furthermore, Vetter claims that “if the disposition is so 
characterized, it is only manifested in yielding the manifestation upon being 
subjected to the stimulus condition” (Vetter 2013, 334–335). Although (a) and 
(b) as briefly explained here may appear to be easily satisfiable within the 
framework of a single–track disposition, further reflections reveal serious 
problems with it. In this case, details aside, Vetter raises two problems each of 
which have to do with stimulus conditions. The first problem concerns 
qualitative diversity of the stimulus conditions. As Vetter puts it: 
 
It is easy to see that most of our everyday dispositions are multi–track. A fragile 
glass may manifest its fragility in breaking upon being hit with a spoon, being 
dropped onto the floor, being sung to by a soprano, or being subjected to 
pressure over a period of time….Irascible people may manifest their irascibility 
by becoming angry upon being yelled at, being politely told to wait, or being 
disagreed with…what we have here are qualitatively different stimulus 
conditions, and accordingly several different conditionals: x would break if it 
were dropped onto the floor, x would break if it were touched, x would break if 
it were sung to by a soprano, and so forth (2013, 335).  
 
The second problem concerns the quantitative diversity of the stimulus 
conditions. In this case, Vetter remarks: 
 
Not only dispositions, but also their typical stimulus conditions come in 
degrees. A glass can be struck with a greater or lesser force, a vase can be 
dropped from a greater or lesser height, a person can be yelled at more or less 
loudly. These properties are quantities: determinable properties with a range of 
determinates ordered by a relation such as that of being greater than (2013, 337–
338).  
 
In light of both the qualitative and the quantitative diversities of the stimulus 
conditions, a single–track disposition view cannot satisfy the two conditions 
above in (a) and (b). Ironically, as Vetter argues, (a) and (b) rather end up 
implying multi–track dispositions. This result has direct bearing on the nature 
of the manifestation of dispositions as well. The remainder of our discussion 
will focus on that.  
According to C. B. Martin, a particular disposition exists or it does not. That 
means that there is no necessary requirement for dispositions to manifest 
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themselves. Martin claims that any unmanifesting disposition can be said to 
straight–out exist. For Martin, the lack of manifestation of a certain disposition 
at any given specific time or at any other time does not show their non–
existence (Martin 2008, 1–2; cf. 1994). As Martin remarks: 
 
It is the unmanifested manifestation, not the disposition itself, that is the would–
be–if or would–have–been–if, if anything is. There can be a disposition A for the 
manifestation of acquiring a further disposition B and, of course, disposition B 
need not itself have any manifestation, but disposition B can still be unfulfilled 
terminus of that for which A has a specific directedness (2008, 2).  
 
From Martin’s remarks, we can extract, at least, two critically important points 
with respect to the nature of dispositions. First, the absence of the manifestation 
of certain dispositions does not in any way show that they do not exist. Second, 
if for whatever reason(s), dispositions are not manifested, then they can be 
taken as unmanifested manifestations. Consider some philosophers’ favorite 
example, a china cup. It has certain dispositions. That is, the disposition to 
shatter if struck. Here the verb ‘struck’ stands for what is taken to be a stimulus 
condition and ‘shatter’ stands for what is understood to be a manifestation. So the 
question remains: will it be the case that every time a stimulus condition is met, 
that we should necessarily expect to see a manifestation of a certain disposition? 
In other words, should we expect to see a china cup shatter when struck? Under 
normal circumstances, the answer for such questions could be affirmative. In 
this case, for example, the SCA (the simple conditional analysis) we saw earlier 
can be said to be true. But there is a catch.  
Suppose again a slightly modified scenario whereby a china cup is covered 
with an extremely thick blanket with multiple layers, such that when struck, the 
thick blanket completely absorbs the forceful impact—blocking it from reaching 
the china cup. In this case, the china cup remains un–shattered. Such is one way 
to understand Martin’s phrase the “unmanifested manifestation.’’ In this case, 
SCA fails. But is there any other sense in which the unmanifested 
manifestations themselves can be taken to be the actual manifestations of a 
different kind?  
To help us properly understand the question raised above, I introduce the 
notion of “stimulus–response relation”. Suppose a car A hits another car B and 
makes a dent on B. Here it could be said that A’s impact was a reason for the 
dent appeared on B. In this case, B was just a passive recipient of A’s action. 
Alternatively, it could also be said that as much as A was responsible in making 
a dent on B, B also was responsible in contributing to the dent on itself by 
entering into mutual causal activity with A. This is because, when A hits B, B 
responded to A by being hit by A. So the interaction between A and B is a two 
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way street (or multiple ways street) interaction as opposed to being a one way 
street. I argue that the latter way reflects the right kind of analysis of the 
scenarios envisioned between A and B and by extension any other similar 
scenarios as well. In light of this, the “stimulus–response relation”, gives us 
deeply inadequate explanation(s) regarding the manifestation(s) of various 
sorts of dispositions. So we have good reasons for rejecting a rigid “stimulus–
response” mechanism. Once this is out of the way, whether or not the 
unmanifested manifestations themselves can be taken as the actual 
manifestations of a different kind turns out to be a defensible notion. Here the 
notion of reciprocal partnership among different dispositions is a good case in 
point.  
For example, as Heil (2012, 120–130)8 argues, if we take a ball’s sphericity, we 
can see that it endows it with a disposition to roll. Heil claims that it is in virtue 
of being spherical that the ball has: the disposition to make a concave, circular 
impression in a cushion; the disposition to reflect light thereby looking 
spherical; and the disposition to feel spherical when we touch it. In light of this, 
Heil claims that talk of single and multi–track dispositions is deeply mistaken 
from the beginning. Heil claims that dispositions quite generally are multi–
track. Hence, dispositions would manifest themselves differently with different 
reciprocal partners (2012, 21). Here Heil is echoing Martin’s two points we saw 
earlier concerning the nature of dispositions. Martin is an ardent defender of 
multi–track dispositions. Taken this way, dispositions have many reciprocal 
partners. That means that negative interfering factors such as absences, 
preventers, antidotes, blockers, inhibitors, etc., will no longer be taken as 
stopping a certain disposition from being manifested. This is because such 
things themselves are dispositions manifesting themselves with various 
reciprocal partners (Heil 2012, 126–130). As Heil remarks:  
 
What of scurvy and the lack of vitamin C? A living body’s healthy condition is 
a mutual manifestation of myriad finely tuned reciprocal disposition partners. 
When one of these is missing, you have a different sort of manifestation, just as 
you have a different sort of manifestation when you remove one of the cards 
from a pair of propped–up playing cards…An absence is not an entity, not 
something with properties providing it with distinctive powers. But certain 
kinds of manifestation require appropriately propertied somethings as 
reciprocal partners. When these are missing, the result is a different kind of 
manifestation (2012, 127). 
 
                                                 
8 I use the term ‘disposition’ where Heil uses, the term ‘power’. On mental dispositions, 
see Owen (2018). 
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Here Heil’s point is that if we embrace a multi–track disposition model, we 
understand that the manifestation of dispositions is not a one way–street as in, 
say one thing causing another in a linear fashion. By contrast, the manifestation 
of dispositions is the result of causings. By ‘causings,’ Heil is referring to 
mutual manifestings of various reciprocal partners (2012, 120). In this case, 
Heil’s account of the manifestation of dispositions adds more clarity to Martin’s 
earlier remarks. That is, rather than talking about unmanifested manifestation, 
now we can talk about manifestations tout court. The manifestation of 
dispositions is multi–faceted in that the apparent absence of the manifestation 
of certain dispositions does not show that no manifestation is taking place. 
Rather it only means that a different kind of manifestation is happening. So 
where does all these leave us?  
The multi–track dispositions view as briefly presented above can be applied 
to shed some light on the doctrine of the incarnation. In the next section, I will 
be sketching out what I earlier called the multi–track disposition model of the 
incarnation. My goal is to show how this model provides us with some insights 
in dealing with the hardest problem of the bearer question.  
 
2.3. Multi–Track Disposition Model of the Incarnation 
 
The multi–track disposition model of the incarnation (MDMI, for short), takes 
the following two claims to be unqualifiedly true: (i) at the incarnation, the 
Logos’s divinity was not diminished in any sense or form; and (ii) at the 
incarnation, the Logos experienced genuine humanity in the person of Jesus of 
Nazareth. Whether or not other models of incarnation take (i) and (ii) with 
some form of qualification is an open question (see Arcadi 2018, 4–7). But 
MDMI rejects introducing any qualifications into (i) and (ii). So MDMI 
embraces (i) and (ii) at face value and tries to understand how they can both be 
true. Understood this way, (i) and (ii) put constraints on MDMI.  
(i) and (ii) are restatements of (1) the identity thesis central to CD. Whether 
taken in the case of the hard problem of the bearer question or the hardest 
problem of the bearer question, at the heart of (1) lies the following question: 
how could the divine and the human natures co–exist in perfect synergy in a 
single person? In addressing this question, much emphasis has been given to 
addressing the logical coherence of ascribing two seemingly incompatible 
attributes to a single person of Christ. This is the hard problem of the bearer 
question. But I also argued that there is the hardest problem of the bearer 
question. As shown in section I, the hardest problem of the bearer question is 
primarily ontological in nature. It attempts to make sense of the Logos’s relation 
to Jesus of Nazareth without violating (1).  
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We also looked at why the notion of “a single bearer–two bearers” proposal 
is defensible without violating the four theses that make up CD. But as 
indicated in the introduction of this essay, (1) enjoys metaphysical centrality. In 
this case, (2) the nature thesis, (3) the distinction thesis and (4) the unity thesis are 
all grounded in (1). So within the framework of the hybrid view introduced and 
defended so far, there are still lingering issues waiting to be resolved. In this 
case, the issue boils down to making sense of the two natures of the incarnate 
Logos in light of “a single bearer–two bearers” scenario. So how does MDMI 
help us in this case? 
According to MDMI, the two natures of the incarnate Logos are dispositional 
properties. An example of divine dispositional properties include omniscience, 
omnipotence and omnipresence and the like. An example of human 
dispositional properties include limitations in knowledge, dependence on God, 
experiencing fear, feeling hungry, feeling thirsty and the like. These are 
dispositional properties because they are properties that the incarnate Logos 
manifests.  
Earlier in the context of our discussion of the metaphysics of dispositions, we 
made a distinction between a single–track disposition and a multi–track 
disposition. It is said that in the case of a single–track disposition, the 
manifestation of any given disposition consists in a single stimulus condition 
and its corresponding manifestation.  
Suppose that the human and the divine dispositional properties of the 
incarnate Logos are single–track. In that case, of the three problems of the 
bearer questions mentioned in section I, a single–track disposition view can be 
said to provide us with an excellent conceptual resource to show that the 
human and the divine dispositional properties can be linked to two 
independent bearers in Christ. If there are two persons in the incarnate Christ, 
then for any given human dispositional property, it will be the case that the 
property in question given an appropriate stimulus condition leads to its 
corresponding manifestation. Similarly, for any given divine dispositional 
property, it will be the case that the property in question given an appropriate 
stimulus condition results in its corresponding manifestation. So a proponent of 
a “two persons view” in one incarnate Christ can easily resolve the problem of 
the bearer question. This is because each independent person in the incarnate 
Christ, namely the divine person and the human person bears the 
corresponding dispositional properties. So the problem of ascribing 
incompatible properties to a single Christ would not arise in the two persons in 
Christ view. But this victory comes with a high price. This is because, the two 
persons in the incarnate Christ view is a Nestorianism heresy and hence, it 
violates CD. So a defender of Orthodox Christology cannot endorse this view 
while at the same time defending (1) – (4), which make up CD.  
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How does a single–track view fair with the hard problem of the bearer 
question? At the heart of the hard problem of the bearer question lies whether 
or not it is logically coherent to attribute incompatible dispositional properties 
to a single bearer. Notice that the sense in which we talk about a single bearer 
view under the hard problem of the bearer question is different compared to 
the sense suggested in the hybrid view. In the hybrid view, the notion of a 
single bearer is understood within the framework of ontological unity that 
characterizes the Logos’s relation to Jesus of Nazareth. As we shall see, the 
notion of a single bearer makes a lot more sense within the framework of the 
hybrid view than it does within the framework of a single bearer view, which 
characterizes the hard problem of the bearer problem. But in the context of the 
hard problem of the bearer question, if the two dispositional properties of the 
incarnate logos are single track, then for any given human dispositional 
property, it will be the case that the property in question given an appropriate 
stimulus condition results in its corresponding manifestation. Similarly for any 
given divine dispositional property, it will be the case that the property in 
question given an appropriate stimulus condition results in its corresponding 
manifestation.  
But the problem we face here turns out to be analogous to the issue of the 
logical coherence of attributing incompatible predicates to a single bearer. That 
is, the problem will be making sense of the coherence of attributing the 
manifestation of incompatible dispositional properties to a single bearer. 
Probably some of the same solutions proposed by philosophers such as 
Timothy Pawl to the logical incoherence problem might be said to help us here 
in resolving the hard problem of the bearer question in relation to a single–track 
disposition view. For now, I do not explore what that possibility might look like 
albeit I remain skeptical of how far success can be obtained in that regard. One 
reason for my skepticism has do with the fact that given a single–track 
disposition as it relates to a single bearer, it is not clear what principled criteria 
governs individual stimulus conditions and their corresponding individual 
manifestations. This makes it hard, inter alia, to see any attractive advantage of 
a single–track disposition to tackle the hard problem of the bearer question.  
On the other hand, if it is seen from the standpoint of the hardest problem of 
the bearer question, a single–track disposition simply falls apart before it even 
gets off the ground. To see this, note that the hardest problem is said to be the 
hardest due to multi–faceted ontological issues it brings up. Here our interest is 
not only in figuring out how the two dispositional properties of the incarnate 
Logos co–exist in a single bearer but also the notion of a single bearer 
understood within a deeper ontological unity. That is precisely what the notion 
of “a single bearer–two bearers’’ scenario tries to capture. So the hybrid view 
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which tries to resolve the hardest problem of the bearer question does not 
accommodate a single track disposition view.  
Notice that my hitherto analysis of a single–track disposition in relation to 
the three problems of the bearer question took it for granted that there are 
single–track dispositions. But in light of our discussion of the metaphysics of 
dispositions in the first part of this section (A), the alleged single–track 
dispositions are not single track after all. Recall, for example, the qualitative 
diversity and the quantitative diversity problems. In the former case, the 
stimulus conditions responsible for various manifestation of dispositions can 
take qualitatively different forms whereas in the latter case, the stimulus 
conditions themselves come in various degrees. Because of these and similar 
other related problems, the very existence of the so–called single–track 
dispositions is entirely rejected. What should we do then? Of course, the answer 
is we should embrace multi–track dispositions.  
 
2.4. Reciprocal Partnership  
 
The great advantage of MDMI is that it does not require us to repeat any of the 
misgivings pointed out with respect to the single–track dispositions. According 
to MDMI, all of the divine dispositional properties that the Logos had in His 
pre–incarnate state did not have to be divested when He became incarnate. This 
is what (i) assumes as stated earlier. The Logos also experienced genuine 
humanity at the incarnation. This is what (ii) assumes as stated earlier. Now the 
issue is to show the unity between (i) and (ii). One way MDMI proposes to 
tackle the issue of unity is by introducing the notion of reciprocal partnership 
between the human and the divine dispositional properties. In this case, 
dispositional properties would manifest themselves differently with different 
reciprocal partners. So for any given human dispositional property and for any 
given divine dispositional property, it is always the case that there is mutual 
cooperation between them. Taken this way, the human and the divine 
dispositional properties of the incarnate Logos have multiple reciprocal 
partners. That means that negative interfering factors such as absences, 
preventers, antidotes, blockers, inhibitors, etc., will no longer be taken as 
stopping a certain disposition from being manifested. This is because such 
things themselves are dispositions manifesting themselves with various 
reciprocal partners.  
For example, the dispositional properties that the Logos did manifest prior to 
His incarnation, such as omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence and others 
have always been manifesting in His post–incarnate state as well. The only 
difference is that the manifestations have been happening in the multi–faceted 
ways or directions. For example, contrary to how the Kenosis theories portray 
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it, when Christ said that He did not know when the end of the age would be, 
that did not show a lack of omniscience on His part at all. If Christ’s claim here 
is taken to mean that He forfeited His omniscience. Rather what was happening 
there was that a different sort of manifestation was manifesting. In other words, 
the stimulus condition (Christ’s humanity) in this case was responsible for 
bringing about the manifestation of Christ’s claim of ignorance. Here one could 
say that the phrase ‘Christ’s claim of ignorance’ sounds a lot like a kenotic or 
kryptic view. This is because kenotic theorists could also say a similar thing 
along the same lines. For example, they could say that the inability of a human 
nature implies why Christ was not able to manifest omniscience.9 
But if we examine this matter within the context of MDMI on the one hand 
and the kenotic or kryptic models on the other, we get radically different 
results. For example, kenotic and kryptic theories tend to be compatible with 
the “stimulus–response relation’’ that I talked about and rejected. Again these 
theories do not embrace the sort of dynamic interaction which is assumed to be 
inherently present in the incarnate Logos’s divine and human dispositional 
properties. There is no indication, as far as I can tell, that these theories locate 
the two dispositional properties of the incarnate Logos within the framework of 
multi–track dispositions. These differences are no small matter, although I 
cannot take up this discussion here. So I do not think that there is any good 
reason to lump MDMI with the kenotic or kryptic model. So if Christ’s 
humanity is taken as an interfering factor in what the Logos would otherwise 
be capable of doing (in this case know the end of the age), our conclusion 
should not be that the Logos somehow divested Himself of His omniscience. 
Rather a different sort of disposition is being manifested in the opposite 
direction with a different reciprocal partner(s). Nor did Christ have to hide, say 
His omniscience, as kryptic theorists claim either. What seems to be the case 
here isn’t the issue of hiding but rather it is the case of the manifestation of 
dispositions linked up with a different kind of reciprocal dispositional partners. 
MDMI does not leave any room for passive existence of any of the dispositional 
properties of the incarnate Logos. 
So it is central to a proponent of MDMI to understand dispositions as being 
always in the state of manifesting themselves in multiple directions and ways. 
In light of this, in whatever the incarnate Logos does, He is always manifesting 
dispositional properties. This means that the incarnate Logos did not have to 
forfeit Himself of anything He necessarily has as a divine being. So given 
MDMI, the incarnate Christ retained His divine and human dispositional 
properties without sacrificing one at the expense of the other. This view, if true, 
not only best accommodates the spirit of CD, but it also unquestionably 
                                                 
9 I thank one of the referees for raising this objection. 
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provides us with resources to make progress in tackling the hardest problem of 
the bearer question, as I will point out shortly. So when it seems to us that the 
incarnate Christ did not manifest His divine nature in certain situations, it was 
not because He somehow emptied Himself of His divine dispositional 
properties in a metaphysical sense. That is, quite literally lacking certain divine 
making properties. Rather given MDMI, the truth is that the incarnate Logos 
did not lose His divine dispositional properties, since the manifestings are 
taking place in the opposite direction. In fact, the very notion of ‘emptying’ or 
‘self–imposed limitations’ makes no sense once we get to the heart of the MDMI 
presented here.  
In light of this, the best way, to understand the Philippians 2:5 ‘kenosis’, 
would be in its functional as opposed to metaphysical sense. Taken in its 
functional sense, all that the ‘emptying’ metaphor shows us is that the incarnate 
Logos made the scenario for various sorts of stimulus conditions to be possible 
by taking on a human form. Whatever the incarnate Logos does, it is the case 
that mutual manifestations of various dispositions linking up with reciprocal 
dispositional partners are operating in multifaceted ways. This is, in fact, 
precisely what seems to be happening in the Gospels where we see the 
incarnate Logos manifesting various sorts of the human dispositional properties 
and the divine dispositional properties. So rather than saying that the incarnate 
Christ does X as a human and Y as a divine, MDMI gives us an excellent 
conceptual framework to use the language of disposition manifestation. In 
doing so, it also shows us in what sense we should understand the incarnate 
Logos’s different acts performed in different circumstances. The key point here 
is to realize that different stimulus conditions result in the manifestation of 
different dispositions. It seems then that the secrete behind all of the incarnate 
Logos’s different manner of doing things may well have to do with the 
manifestation of various dispositions consistent with various stimulus 
conditions that generally lead to their manifestations. 
In light of the hitherto discussion, MDMI points us in the right direction as to 
how we could go about tackling the hardest problem of the bearer question. 
First, it shows us how the two dispositional properties of the incarnate Logos 
can co–exist in perfect harmony in a single unified bearer. Second, it gives us 
conceptual resources to accommodate the notion of “a single bearer–two 
bearers” within the constraints placed by CD. So MDMI is more at home with 
the hybrid view defended in this essay that does justice to the core tenets of CD 
as stated in (1) – (4).  
In part III, I briefly show the contrast between MDMI and its rival, the 
Kenotic Model of Incarnation (Kenotic view, for short). 
 
3. The Kenosis Model of the Incarnation 
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Unlike MDMI, the kenotic view resolves the hardest problem of the bearer 
question by claiming that while the human dispositional properties remain 
unchanged, the divine ones are divested while the Logos is incarnate. A kenotic 
Christology first emerged in the nineteenth century. Central biblical passages to 
the development of Kenosis theories, include: Philippians 2:5–11 and Mark 
13:32. As we shall see, the Greek word ‘kenosis’ which is mentioned in 
Philippians 2:5 and translated as “emptying” or “emptied”, plays a pivotal role 
in the way kenosis theories are often characterized. In the case of Mark 13:32, 
Jesus’s confession of ignorance as to when the day or hour of the end times 
would be is taken to imply some sort of self–limitations on His part. But what 
sets the tone for all parties involved in this discussion concerns what to make of 
the word ‘emptying’ or ‘emptied’ in Philippians 2:5. Commenting on 
Philippians 2:5–8, biblical scholar, Dorothea Bertschmann (2018) remarks that 
the notion of self–emptying can be taken as contrasting alternatives to either 
grabbing or clutching Godlikeness. In this case, the sort of attitude Christ may 
have rejected could well be grabbing, clutching, or selfishly using Godlikeness 
(Bertschmann 2018, 237). But discussion amongst kenotic theorists regarding 
the doctrine of kenosis is often philosophical in nature. What precisely is the 
central thesis of the doctrine of kenosis? As Oliver Crisp puts it, “the notion of 
divine kenosis…is the idea that somehow the Word of God empties himself of 
certain divine attributes in order to become incarnate” (2007, xi).  
Crisp’s characterization of the kenosis doctrine shows us what allegedly 
must happen on the part of the Logos to ensure genuine humanity. In this case, 
the Logos is said to have emptied Himself of certain divine dispositional 
properties. Often the kenotic theorist’s favorite properties in this case are: 
omnipotence, omniscience and omnipresence. It is also said that the Logos 
emptied Himself of such properties temporarily (see Morris 1989, 119; see also 
Hick 1993, chap. 6). To get a good picture of this view, it is also important to 
keep in mind that not all kenotic theorists speak in one language in the way 
they spell out the details involved in the Logos’s emptying Himself of the sorts 
of dispositional properties mentioned above.  
For example, a notable nineteenth century theologian, Gottfried Thomasius 
argued that the Logos had to forfeit certain properties (e.g., omniscience), to 
ensure genuine humanity. However, Thomasius also argued that at no point, 
the Logos divested Himself of His deity (1965, 46–56; see also Feenstra 1989, 
129–133). Other kenotic theorists think that kenosis resulted not only in the 
Logos’s loss of the eternal self–consciousness but also marks the occasion 
whereby the Logos became a human soul. Still others think that even if the 
Logos did not lose divinity, kenosis perhaps changed the Logos’s mode of being 
(existence) permanently. Yet again others say that the Logos might have lived a 
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double life, that is, acting as a sustainer of the universe while at the same time 
being subject to limitations imposed on Him by His humanity (see Moreland 
and Craig 2003, 604–605).  
The hitherto characterization as briefly summarized above could be taken as 
a strong version of the kenosis doctrine. This is because, the theories in one way 
or another require the Logos to divest Himself of certain dispositional 
properties in order to assume a complete human nature. In this case, the kenotic 
view stands in sharp contrast with the hybrid view defended in sections I and II 
of this essay. On kenotic view, it seems like the bearer of divine dispositional 
properties gives way to the bearer of the human dispositional properties. The 
balance in this case is tipped in favor of magnifying the humanity of the 
incarnate Logos. But MDMI in this case does a better job than its rival the 
kenotic view in terms of doing justice for the ontological status of the person of 
the incarnate Logos. It does this by allowing the human and the divine 
dispositional properties of the incarnate Logos to co–exist in a single bearer.  
But recently a lively discussion has resurfaced in the literature which, in my 
view, restructures the kenosis doctrine in such a way that does not require the 
Logos to divest Himself of any of His dispositional properties. In this case, the 
doctrine of krypsis, or concealment takes center stage. For example, in his book 
A Kryptic Model of the Incarnation, Andrew Ter Ern Loke (2014) argues that 
during the incarnation, the Logos did not divest Himself of certain supernatural 
attributes; rather these properties were hidden. Loke develops the details for 
this view within the framework of what he calls, the Divine Preconscious Model 
(DPM). Details aside, central to Loke’s DPM is the notion that at the 
incarnation, the Logos’s dispositional properties (e.g., omniscience, 
omnipotence, and omnipresence) were hidden in the Logos’s divine 
preconscious state. In this case, a human nature was assumed which also is said 
to include a human preconscious. The key to Loke’s kryptic model is that no 
divine dispositional properties, as I call them, had to be lost or divested to make 
room for incarnation. So unlike the mainstream kenosis doctrine, Loke’s version 
of the kryptic model of the incarnation can be taken as a weaker form of the 
general kenosis doctrine.  
As should be expected, the literature is full of interesting responses, counter–
responses and general criticisms of both the strong and the weak versions of the 
kenosis doctrine (see Crisp 2007, chap. 5 and Hick 1993, chap. 6). Morris 
introduced his famous and much discussed ‘two minds’ view of the incarnation 
as an alternative to kenosis theory (see Morris 1989, 110–127). But Morris’s own 
view was criticized on grounds that it could open a door for Nestorianism (see 
Moreland and Craig 2003, 612 and Hick 1993, 58–76).  
Compared to the kryptic model of the incarnation, again I believe that MDMI 
stands better equipped to give us a dynamic theologically and philosophically 
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more informative analysis as to how the two dispositional properties of the 
incarnate Logos co–exist in a single bearer. MDMI does a better job in 
explaining what form the manifestation of the two dispositional properties of 
the incarnate Logos take. I find the kryptic view trading on a lot of obscure 
notions of hidden dispositional properties of the incarnate Logos. I do not think 
that we have any secure understanding as to how the incarnate Logos hides 
certain divine dispositional properties (cf. Arcadi 2016, 459–463). Let alone in 
the case of the incarnate Logos, even in our own case, we have an extremely 
impoverished grasp of how the mind–body interaction works. By contrast, 
MDMI provides us with a straightforward analysis of why and how both the 
dispositional properties of the incarnate Logos are kept intact.  
Taken this way, I also do not see how the kenosis doctrine (strong and weak) 
can be said to do justice to CD (cf. Moreland and Craig, 2003, 605). I say this 
because kenosis theorists attempting to explain CD seem to involve interpretive 
revisions to CD. Such revisions precisely come in forms that I have extensively 
argued against in this essay. Here I raise three of them. First, the kenosis 
theories seem to be guilty of what I called in part II, the humanity favoring 
problem. In this case, such theories fail to resolve the hardest problem of the 
bearer question. Given kenotic theories only the human bearer of the 
dispositional properties is magnified. But why leave out the divine bearer of 
dispositional properties? That means that these theories fail to do justice to the 
notion of ‘‘a single bearer–two bearers’’ explained and defended in part II.  
Second, the kenosis theories suffer from attempting to have one’s cake and 
eat it too. What I mean by this is that most (if not all) of the pro–Chalcedonian 
kenosis theorists do not want to allow the Logos’s divinity to be compromised 
(see Evans 2002). Yet at the same time, they also cannot help but require the 
Logos to divest some of His divine dispositional properties such as omniscience 
and omnipresence. If so, how can they have it both ways? The answer often 
given for this is that the sort of dispositional properties said to have been 
divested by the Logos are not essential. But the sort of interpretation kenotic 
theorists give to dispositional properties such as omniscience and omnipresence 
remains to be highly controversial (see Plantinga 1998; Beilby and Eddy 2001). 
Although unlike the mainstream kenosis theory, the kryptic model of the 
incarnation recognizes that the Logos did not divest any of His divine 
properties, the very notion of such properties get portrayed as being hidden 
temporarily to leave room for the human nature slips back just like its cousin 
(i.e., kenosis theory) into the humanity favoring problem. So the kryptic model 
also fails to resolve the hardest problem of the bearer question. Hence, the 
kryptic model of the incarnation cannot avoid violating CD.  
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Third, for all the reasons stated in sections I and II, kenosis theories (strong 
or weak versions), cannot avoid a revisionist reading into the Chalcedonian 
statement. Hence, they inevitably suffer from the problem of over–emphasizing 
the Logos’s divinity over His humanity or over–emphasizing His humanity 
over His divinity. But the theory we need in order to be able to capture the 
heart of the Chalcedonian statement is one that does not attempt to introduce 
any revisionist readings into the Chalcedonian statement. In this case, MDMI 
does a good job as I argued. We need a theory that attempts to capture or at 
least points us in a promising conceptual direction in showing us how to think 
about CD without thereby violating the ontological status of the person of the 
incarnate Logos.  
 
4. Further Questions and Conclusion  
 
In this final section, my aim is to raise metaphysical questions that emerge from 
the bearer question for future research considerations. 
Back to the hardest problem of the bearer question. Consider a red apple 
sitting on a kitchen table. Here, at least, two things can be singled out, namely, 
an apple, which is said to be an object and the redness of an apple, which is said 
to be a property. Here terms such as ‘object’ and ‘property’ can also be used 
interchangeably with related traditional Aristotelian terms such as, ‘substance’ 
(ousia) and ‘attribute’ (Loux 1978). A substance is a property bearer whereas a 
property is the way a substance is (see Heil 2012, chap. 2). To say that a 
property is the way a substance is, is to say that a property characterizes a 
substance as being a certain way. For example, the redness of a particular apple 
characterizes an apple as being red. In this case, the sort of relation that is said 
to exist between an apple (substance) and its redness (attribute) consists in the 
latter standing to the former in an exemplification or instantiation relation. A 
substance exemplifies a property and a property in turn gets exemplified by a 
substance. It is also the case that an apple and its redness belong to two distinct 
ontological categories. That is, the category of substance is not the same as the 
category of property. By ‘category’ it is meant that the general kinds under 
which things fall.  
From an existential standpoint, properties ontologically depend on their 
bearers but the converse is not the case. Or in typical Aristotelian style, a 
property is said to be predicated of a substance but a substance is not said to be 
predicated of a property. So ontologically speaking, a substance is more 
fundamental in that it provides a metaphysical ground for the existential status 
of properties (see Ackrill 1963). In light of this, the question we should ask is 
this: does the Logos somehow stand to certain divine disposition making 
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properties in the manner an apple stands to redness or redness stands to an 
apple? 
More specifically, the bearer question gets more complicated in the following 
way. To see this, I turn to Aristotle’s Categories (1963). There Aristotle 
introduces a distinction between a primary substance, or as some philosophers 
call it, ‘individual substance’ (see Lowe 2015, 70–72) or a concrete familiar object 
(Loux and Crisp 2017, Chap. 1) such as ‘this Plato’ and a secondary substance or 
‘substantial kind’, such as ‘human’ (Lowe 2015, 71). Human is the kind to which 
concrete familiar objects belong. In Aristotle’s ontology ‘human’ is a kind–term 
which fixes the essence of a primary substance. That is, a particular Plato is said 
to be a human being not because Plato is white but because Plato belongs to a 
kind ‘human’. Plato’s whiteness is an accidental property. A property P, is said 
to be accidental for a person S, if S can lose P thereby without ceasing to exist. 
By contrast, a property P, is said to be essential for a person, S, if S cannot 
continue to exist without P. For example, if Plato loses ‘humanness’, then there 
would be no chance for Plato to exist. So ‘humanness’ is an essential property 
for Plato. Understood this way, ‘humanness’ is a kind universal.  
Does the incarnate Logos have its divinity by belonging to a kind–divine? 
And does the incarnate Logos have its humanity by belonging to a kind–
human? If our answer for each of these questions is affirmative, then how can 
we escape the sort of problems associated with the well–known Euthyphro 
dilemma? Moreover, are the kind–divine and the kind–human universals? By 
‘universals’, I mean properties that can be instantiated in multiple 
spatiotemporal domain at once. The sense in which I used the notion of 
‘property’ as discussed above in relation to apple (i.e., redness) is different 
compared to kind universal. Neo–Aristotelian philosophers draw a distinction 
between two kinds of universals, namely property universals such as a 
particular redness of an apple and a kind universal such as humanness 
(Galluzzo 2015, Chap. 4).  
Consider the kind–human, in relation to the embodied Logos and the rest of 
us humans. In what sense can the embodied Logos be said to share humanity 
with the rest of us? Is it by standing in a certain relation to the kind universal 
‘humanity’ just like us or is there a different mode of instantiation of humanity 
that is unique to the embodied Logos? 
Suppose one rejects universals. In that case, one might embrace properties as 
particulars; that is, rather than assuming properties as being multiply 
exemplifiable entities, one takes them to be exemplifiable only by a particular 
object at a particular time and space. For example, John exemplifies a property 
of being human. And similarly, Mark exemplifies a property of being human. 
But there is no universal ‘humanity’ of which John’s exemplifying a property of 
being human is said to be a token of. Similarly, Mark exemplifying a property 
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of being human, is not a token instantiation of the universal ‘humanity’. John 
and Mark each exemplifies their own individual property of being human. On 
this view, there is no type (i.e. universal) of which individual, distinct tokens 
can be said to be instances of. John’s property of being a human and Mark’s 
property of being a human share nothing in common. However, in all other 
aspects, they can be said to share qualitatively similar properties. Taken this 
way, the Logos’s property of being human is individually distinct from Marks 
property of being human. If so, is such a characterization theologically sound? 
Does it reflect CD’s conception of the Logos’s humanity?  
In this paper, I attempted to analyze what the Chalcedonian Definition 
amounts to by giving an extensive discussion of the bearer question. In this 
case, I used my discussion of the bearer question to lay a ground for proposing 
the Multi–Track Disposition Model of the Incarnation. I have tried to show why 
this model provides us with better conceptual resources compared to the 
kenosis model in dealing with questions that arise as a result of the two natures 
of Christ in one person. Finally I listed further metaphysical questions that 
emerge from the bearer question which add further layers to the complexity 
that besets the bearer question. In light of all such observations, I conclude that 
with all that is being said and done, a conclusive answer to the bearer question 
still proves to be elusive.10 
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